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ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
By Susan Block-Lieb* 
INTRODUCTION 
Industry and political actors oppose the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection (the Bureau or CFPB) on the grounds that its institutional design 
ensures its lack of accountability.1 When complaining about the Bureau’s 
lack of accountability, opponents point primarily to the CFPB’s regulatory 
and financial independence, and to the fact that a single director heads the 
Bureau rather than a bipartisan panel of commissioners.2 Based on these 
complaints, the House of Representatives passed a bill in 2011 to strengthen 
the authority of the Council on Financial Stability to set aside regu- 
lations issued by the Bureau.3 Earlier, the Senate—well, really a cadre of 
Republican senators—vowed to filibuster the appointment of any director to 
the new CFPB.4 By the time the Bureau “went live” on the date set by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the Senate still had not consented to the President’s 
nomination of Richard Cordray as Director for the CFPB.5 Rather than 
allow this political hijacking to stymie the Bureau altogether, President 
Obama appointed Cordray under his recess appointments powers. 6   As 
might be imagined, Cordray’s recess appointment has not endeared the 
CFPB or its efforts to regulate consumers’ financial decision-making to the 
                                                                                                                                
 *  Cooper Family Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Ted 
Janger and all the participants at the conference held at Brooklyn Law School to consider the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau one year after its creation.  
 1. See, e.g., David Hirschmann, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Needs More 
Accountability, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211 
/69992.html (President of U.S. Chamber of Commerce arguing that “in creating the CFPB last 
year, Congress exempted this new agency from virtually all the normal checks and balances” and 
proposing three reforms to restructure the design of the Bureau); Neil Weinberg, Why Dodd-Frank 
is Regulatory Overkill, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2011, at 9-9, available at http://www 
.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dodd-frank-weinberg-1042465-1.html; Press Release, House Fin. 
Servs. Comm’n, Chair Bacchus Comments on Legal Challenge to Dodd-Frank Act (June 21, 
2012), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID 
=300403 (“As it is currently structured, the CFPB is one of the most powerful and least 
accountable agencies in all of Washington.”). 
 2. Hirschmann, supra note 1.   3. H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-89, at pt. I (May 25, 2011) 
(House Report accompanying passage of H.R. 1315).  
 4. See Ylan Q. Mui, GOP’s Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader, Stands by Vow to 
Block CFPB Nominees, WASH. POST, June 10, 2011, at A12. 
 5. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordray 
-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html?pagewanted=all. 
 6. Id. The President’s recess appointments powers are found in article II, section 2, clause 2, 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
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political right. 7  Cordray’s recess appointment as Director arguably per-
mitted the President to evade Senate review of his appointment, further 
reducing the Director’s accountability to Congress.8   
To what extent are these objections justified? Is the CFPB accountable 
to no one? 
This essay argues that concerns about the CFPB’s lack of accountability 
are partly right and mostly wrong. Congressional critics correctly note that 
the structure of the CFPB differs from other independent administrative 
agencies. A single director heads the Bureau, rather than a panel of 
commissioners appointed for fixed (and often staggered) terms as normally 
govern independent agencies.9 In addition, the Bureau’s annual budget is 
virtually guaranteed and nearly free from congressional revision, although 
most independent agencies have to seek funding from Congress and often 
face annual appropriations battles.10 
But to focus on the Bureau’s financial independence and single director 
is to miss the distinct political deal struck when Congress created the CFPB. 
Typically, an administrative agency is structured as an independent agency 
in order to insulate regulators from interest group influence. 11  Because 
capture often is accomplished through political channels, in the past, 
                                                                                                                                
 7. This summer, suit was brought claiming that Cordray’s recess appointment is 
unconstitutional. See Suzy Khimm, Obama’s Consumer Watchdog Gets Sued, WASH. POST (June 
22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/22/obamas-consumer-
watchdog-gets-sued/. 
        8. The D.C. Circuit recently struck down adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board 
on the basis that President Obama appointed three members of the Board in contravention of the 
appointments and recess appointments clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See Canning v. NLRB, 
Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (construing Recess 
Appointments Clause of Constitution to allow such appointment only during intersessional 
recesses of the Senate and only then to vacancies that “happen” because it first “comes into being” 
during such a recess; because three members of the Board were appointed in violation of these 
requirements, the court held that the Board acted ultra vires without the requisite quorum). The 
D.C. Circuit’s decision creates a circuit conflict on this issue. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 
1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the Recess” includes intrasessional recesses and 
upholding judicial appointment under Recess Appointments Clause), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 
(2005). How the D.C. Circuit’s opinion might affect rulemaking and Directorial actions by the 
CFPB remains unclear. Compare Adam Levitin, NLRB and CFPB: Recess Appointments, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Jan. 25, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/01/nlrb-and-cfpb-
recess-appointments.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed 
%3A+creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29, with Deephak Gopta, The CFPB and the Recess 
Appointment: DeFacto Officer Doctrine to the Rescue?, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog 
/2013/01/the-cfpb-and-the-recess-appointment-de-facto-officer-doctrine-to-the-rescue.html. 
 9. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1137–39 (2000).  
 10. Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The 
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 
1823 (2012). 
 11. Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (noting that “the creation of an independent agency is often motivated 
by a concern with agency capture”). 
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independent agencies also have been structured to be insulated from 
executive pressure.12 Creating an independent commission with a bipartisan 
panel of commissioners holding staggered terms would insulate bureaucrats 
from this sort of influence.13  
Industry influence was considered to be a contributing factor to the 
subprime mortgage crisis.14 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found 
that regulators were aware of the marketing and mass distribution of 
subprime mortgages and, due to industry pressure and ideological myopia, 
determined to do nothing.15 Congress sought to prevent the possibility of 
further influence of this sort with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).16  
Uniquely, the CFPB is structured to insulate this independent agency 
not only from interest group influence and executive interference, but also 
from congressional reversal. That is, Congress intentionally designed the 
Bureau to insulate it somewhat from direct congressional control. 
This feature of the CFPB’s design, while unusual, is not anti-
democratic; it is precisely what the democratically elected Congress that 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Act sought to accomplish. Like Ulysses tied to the 
mast, the institutional design of the Bureau works like a pre-commitment 
device. All pre-commitment devices involve accountability deficits—that is 
precisely the point. 
Tying up Congress’ ability to interfere with consumer financial 
protection regulation made particular sense in this context. Given its diffuse 
benefits and narrowly defined costs, consumer protection legislation has 
always been difficult to enact and even more difficult to enforce.17 These 
“client politics” can and have given way,18 especially in periods of crisis, to 
permit enactment.19 In this case, the CFPB was created in reaction to the 
subprime mortgage crisis. 20 With the help of several political entrepre-
                                                                                                                                  12. See id. at 19–21.  
 13. Recent Legislation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2128 (2011).    14. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at 
xvii (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (discussion of industry influence); Barkow, supra note 11, 
at 54.  
 15. FCIC REPORT, supra note 14, at xviii. 
 16. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 72–73, 74.  
 17. See, e.g., Peter Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY 
L.J. 587, 623–57 (1995). 
 18. James Q. Wilson first coined the term “client politics,” which refers to the politics of 
issues with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 76 (1991). Wilson distinguished “client politics” from 
“entrepreneurial politics” involving diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. Id. at 77. Wilson’s 
insights derive in large part from earlier economic work by Mancur Olson. See MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971). 
 19. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuate, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2012). 
 20. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 227–28 (2011). 
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neurs,21 congressional forces succeeded in countering opposition from the 
financial industry to enact the Dodd-Frank Act.22 But once the fever from 
this crisis diminishes, the diffuse benefits and narrowly defined costs of 
regulation suggest that the Bureau’s efforts to adopt and enforce consumer 
financial protection regulation will confront the same concentrated 
opposition that made creation of the Bureau seem unlikely.23 The CFPB’s 
independence is intended to make congressional interference more difficult. 
Moreover, the Bureau’s “accountability deficits” are not especially 
troubling. By statutory design, the CFPB shares its regulatory space with 
numerous political actors.24 Because it is indirectly accountable to a wide 
range of both political and industry interests, the CFPB is less likely to 
promulgate overreaching regulations that protect consumer interests to the 
detriment of all else. 
The remainder of this essay supports the argument sketched out above, 
and proceeds as follows. Part I is descriptive. It briefly recounts the 
Bureau’s creation story to contrast the web of federal and state agencies 
previously vested with jurisdiction over consumer financial protection with 
the current regulatory space set out by Dodd-Frank. 
Part II explains the importance of the Bureau’s independence from 
Congress. This independence “mirrors” the consensus that existed upon 
Dodd-Frank’s passage.25 Congress designed the CFPB so that the Bureau 
                                                                                                                                
 21. The CFPB is well understood to be the brainchild of two law professors: Oren Bar-Gil and 
Elizabeth Warren. See Oren Bar-Gil & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (2008); see also, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 72; Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. 
Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORD. URB. L.J. 681, 692 
(2011). 
 22. President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall 
Street Reform: “No Easy Task,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-
task.  
 23. John Coffee calls this toing-and-froing the “Regulatory Sine Curve.” Coffee, supra note 
19, at 1029–30. His intuition that financial regulation ebbs and flows between periods of crisis and 
amnesia regarding the last crisis event is widely shared, however. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, 
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: 
The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 972–73 (2005) (“Crisis 
. . . created the ‘policy window’ through which political entrepreneurs could launch their 
initiatives. Moreover, the regulation that we observe at a particular juncture in time is not 
permanently in place. As political pressures change, as a result of exogenous events and 
technological change, so too will regulation.”). 
 24. The term “shared regulatory space” belongs to Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi. See, e.g., 
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131 (2012). 
 25. Political scientists use the term “mirroring” to describe politicians’ tendency to “create a 
decision-making environment in an agency in which the distribution of influence among 
constituencies reflects the political forces that gave rise to the agency’s legislative mandate.” 
McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive 
and Administrative Agencies, at 1713, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell 
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would be insulated from congressional meddling but still answerable to 
other important political actors—in particular, other prudential regulators 
and the President. This design serves to counteract the “client politics” that 
are likely to be involved in any financial regulation, particularly consumer 
financial protection regulation, which only diffusely benefits the consumers 
it looks to protect.26 The CFPB’s independence has been controversial. This 
section also discusses industry and political complaints regarding the 
Bureau’s institutional design and broad jurisdiction that have arisen since 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, including various bills introduced in 
Congress to “reform” the newly constituted CFPB. 
Whether the CFPB will succeed in withstanding industry pressure and 
political forces remains to be seen and depends, to a large extent, on 
whether the CFPB can, in practical effect, be held accountable to political 
and economic opponents while preserving this independence. Part III 
returns to Dodd-Frank, the legislation that created the CFPB, to tackle the 
issue of the Bureau’s likely responsiveness to these concerns when 
promulgating and enforcing regulations. Combing through the statute, this 
section details the ex ante and ex post regulatory limits on the Bureau’s 
authority. Through these political and procedural limits, this section finds 
that the CFPB is both independent and accountable. It finds that the CFPB 
is accountable to Congress and to the prudential regulators that possess 
overlapping jurisdiction. Industry actors and consumer advocates will have 
a say on the regulations the Bureau proposes. Its independence, thus, 
involves a carefully calibrated balancing of interests in tension. 
I. EMERGENCE OF THE CFPB 
The Dodd-Frank Act created the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection and granted it authority both to regulate consumer finance 
transactions and monitor and enforce these and other regulations.27 Dodd-
Frank shifted pre-existing regulatory authority that had been scattered 
among several federal regulators to one federal agency, the CFPB, with 
exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate regulations regarding the federal 
consumer financial protection laws and primary jurisdiction to monitor and 
enforce those laws.28 With this shift, Dodd-Frank affected the source of 
                                                                                                                                
Polinsky & Stephen Shavell eds., 2007); see also, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & 
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 243, 262 (1987). 
 26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the term “client politics”). 
 27. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 21, at 700–03.  
 28. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 227–28. The “federal consumer financial laws” is a 
defined term within Dodd-Frank, which includes the “enumerated consumer laws,” another 
defined term, plus Dodd-Frank’s provisions. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1002(14), 
1002(12), 124 Stat 1367, 1957 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (2010)). While the Dodd-
Frank Act grants the Bureau exclusive authority to promulgate regulations to protect consumers’ 
financial transactions, id. § 1022(b)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512), it grants the Bureau only 
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rulemaking authority, as well as the location of monitoring and enforcement 
of these rules.  
Few substantive changes were effected with this legislative enactment, 
however. Instead, Dodd-Frank left substantive changes to consumer 
financial protection regulation in the hands of this newly constituted 
Bureau. Congress’ shift in jurisdiction over regulatory enforcement in this 
way is best explained in the context of recent history. 
This history of consumer financial protection has seen its laws scattered 
across more than a dozen different federal and fifty states’ laws. Congress 
first enacted consumer protection regulation with the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act) in 1914.29 Its 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments 
to the FTC Act broadly permitted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
regulate “unfair and deceptive” practices, without need to prove that the 
practices affected competition.30 A number of state legislatures had enacted 
their own “Little FTC Acts” and other statutes regulating unfair and 
deceptive practices, which from time to time have been applied to unfair or 
deceptive practices in consumer lending.31 In addition, starting in 1968 with 
the Truth in Lending Act,32 Congress enacted roughly fourteen other federal 
consumer financial laws.33 
                                                                                                                                
shared authority to enforce consumer financial protection regulation. See id. §§ 1024(c), 1025(c), 
1026(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(c), 5515(c), 5516(d)). The Bureau shares its enforcement 
authority over nondepository consumer lenders with the Federal Trade Commission (the FTC). 
See id. § 1024(c). As to consumer lenders that are depository institutions, the Bureau enjoys 
exclusive federal enforcement authority over “too big to fail” banks, see id. § 1025(c), but has 
limited authority to enforce consumer financial protection regulations against other banks—as to 
these, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) may enjoy exclusive federal 
enforcement authority. See id. § 1026(d). Moreover, Dodd-Frank reserves substantial authority for 
state attorneys general to enforce federal consumer financial protection regulations against 
depository and nondepository consumer lenders. See id. §§ 1041, 1042, 1044–1046 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5551, 5552, 5554–5556). For discussion of the differences in the enforcement 
relationships between the Bureau and banking regulators, on one hand, and the Bureau and the 
FTC, on the other, see infra text accompanying notes 162–187. 
 29. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2011)). 
 30. Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111–12 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 45) (amending FTC Act § 5(a)). 
 31. State law often also governs consumer financial protection. Often these state statutes 
prohibit “unfair and deceptive practices” (UDAP); some state laws list express practices that are 
prohibited, while others set an open-ended standard for prohibited practices and leave definition of 
the standard either to the FTC or to state courts, or both. For detailed discussion of these UDAP 
statutes, see, e.g., Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical 
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Practices Statutes, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984). Enforcement of 
this body of state law was complicated by preemption regulations issued by the OCC and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in the 1990s. For discussion of these regulations and Supreme 
Court case law considering the propriety of this preemption through regulation, see infra text 
accompanying notes 42–43. 
 32. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, §§ 101–145, 82 Stat. 146, 146–59 
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2011)). 
 33. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(12), 124 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (listing 
and citing to these “enumerated consumer laws”). 
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Rulemaking authority was also spread across multiple federal 
agencies.34 Although the FTC is expressly precluded from regulating the 
practices of banks and other similar financial institutions,35 it nonetheless 
has construed its jurisdiction to permit regulation of the unfair and 
deceptive financial practices of other sorts of consumer lenders. 36  The 
federal agencies charged with regulating these federally chartered 
depositary institutions similarly prohibit unfair and deceptive practices,37 
although these prudential regulators did not exercise their jurisdiction to 
regulate unfair or deceptive practices until after 2008.38 In addition to this 
authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices, Congress granted the 
Federal Reserve Board (the Fed or Board) jurisdiction to promulgate 
regulations to implement most of the federal consumer financial laws.39 
Regulation is only effective if it is enforced. Before enactment of Dodd-
Frank, enforcement of consumer financial protection laws had been shared 
by a number of federal and state regulators. Regulatory jurisdiction 
depended on the nature of the lender.40  Federal enforcement authorities 
included the FTC (so long as the consumer lender was not a federally 
                                                                                                                                
 34. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 (2012) (noting that before Dodd-Frank 
created the CFPB, “the authority to write rules to implement the majority of the federal consumer 
financial protection laws, the power to enforce these laws, and the supervisory authority over the 
individuals and companies offering and selling consumer financial products and services were 
predominately shared by five different banking regulators, as well as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)”). 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). Congress amended the FTC Act in 1975 to give the OCC, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the federal prudential regulators (together 
referred to as the Agencies) jurisdiction to enforce the FTC Act and its regulations as to banks, 
savings associations, and credit unions. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, sec. 202(a), § 108(f)(1), (f)(2), 88 Stat. 
2183, 2196 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1)) [hereinafter 1975 Amendments] (adding  
§ 18(f)(1) to FTC Act). These Agencies did not exercise their FTC Act rulemaking authority for 
more than twenty-five years. See, e.g., James Huizinga, Michael McEneney, John van de Weert & 
Karl Kaufmann, UDAP Regulations for Credit Card Issuers, 64 BUS. LAW. 639, 640 (2009); Julie 
L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of 
the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 BUS. LAW. 1243 (2003). 
 36. See, e.g., FTC Regulation Concerning Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 
16 C.F.R. 433.1, 433.2, 40 Fed. Reg. No. 223, 53506 (Nov. 18, 1975) (FTC’s holder in due course 
rule). 
 37. See CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2.  
 38. See Huizinga, et al., supra note 35, at 640.  
 39. See CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2; TILA, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 146, 148 
(1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1604), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,  
§ 1100A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2107–09 (2010) (replacing the Board’s authority to promulgate rules 
with that of the CFPB).  
 40. Moreover, a lender’s “nature” could be changed by the simple expedient of a change in 
registration. State-chartered banks that found their regulators too nosy and intrusive might re-
emerge as a federally chartered entity. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 159–160; see also, 
e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45 (noting that “banks and thrifts have a great deal of 
flexibility in determining whom they wish to be chartered by, and it has little effect on their 
business plans”).  
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chartered bank or some other federally regulated financial institution)41 or 
the prudential regulator charged with authority over the consumer lender (if 
the lender was a regulated financial institution).42 In theory, state banking 
regulators and state attorneys general also held jurisdiction to enforce state 
and possibly federal laws—unless the lender was a federally chartered bank 
or otherwise subject to federal banking regulation—but in 2004, this source 
of state enforcement largely evaporated. The Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
promulgated regulations preempting state enforcement actions. 43  These 
regulations were broad in reach, applying not only to federally chartered 
thrifts and banks, but also to state-chartered entities that were operating 
subsidiaries of federally chartered thrifts or banks.44 
Consumers are themselves another source of enforcement authority, at 
least theoretically. While courts had early on held that the FTC Act did not 
create a private right of action,45 most of the federal consumer financial 
laws expressly permitted suit.46 Indeed, many of these statutes explicitly 
granted consumers the right to bring a class action;47 where actual damages 
could not be established, statutory damages were instead expressly 
available.48 Although these statutes imposed limits on the statutory damages 
that might have been recovered in the case of a class action, the limits were 
themselves generous. 49  No one argues that consumers provide anything 
more than a second-best means for enforcement of the federal consumer 
finance laws, however. Consumers are a diffuse and under-financed  
source of regulatory enforcement.50 Although some of the federal consumer 
financial statutes sought to encourage consumers to bring watch-dog actions 
                                                                                                                                
 41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Moreover, banks (but not other lenders) might 
have a range of federal charters to choose from based, in part, on the extent of the regulation and 
the breadth of regulatory authority that came along with the choice. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2011). 
 44. Id. In Watters v. Wachovia, N.A., the Supreme Court upheld the OCC’s preemption 
regulation as applied to the jurisdiction of state banking authorities over state-chartered operating 
subsidiaries of national banks. Watters v. Wachovia, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007). 
 45. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding 
that private litigants cannot sue for violations of the FTC Act). 
 46. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1679g(a) (2012) (providing liability when a Credit Repair 
Organization fails to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1693); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (creating liability for 
willful noncompliance with credit reporting regulations in 15 U.S.C. § 1681); 15 U.S.C. § 1681o 
(creating liability for negligent noncompliance with credit reporting regulations in 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1681); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (providing liability for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1693); 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1692k(a) (providing liability for debt collectors who fail to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692).  
 47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679g(a)(2)(B), 1691e(2), 1692k(a)(2)(B), 1693m(a)(2)(B).  
 48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (providing statutory damages). 
 49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (capping class action claims at the “lesser of $500,000 or 1 
per centum of the net worth of the debt collection”); 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(2)(B) (capping class 
action claims at the “lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the defendant”).  
 50. See, e.g., Letsou, supra note 17, at 650.  
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by authorizing class actions and awarding statutory damages, courts cut 
back on these encouragements from time to time.51 
The subprime mortgage crisis, thus, occurred despite the existence of a 
plethora of federal and state regulators with jurisdiction to enforce broad 
consumer financial protection regulation. While the sheer number of 
enforcers might have resulted in too much enforcement of existing 
consumer financial protection laws, in practice the result was too little 
enforcement (too little, at least, with the benefit of hindsight).52 This under-
enforcement of the federal consumer finance laws might have been 
predicted simply from the number of agencies with overlapping 
enforcement authority. 53  While several agencies might have proceeded 
against a lender’s unfair or deceptive practice, none did, perhaps thinking 
that the other would.54 
Negative common pool problems could plague any shared regulatory 
space, but these regulatory misincentives were exacerbated by the 
governance structure of at least some of the prudential regulators.55 Neither 
the OCC nor the OTS received funding from Congress, instead paying for 
their bureaucratic budgets by means of fees paid by the entities they 
regulated. 56  This fee-paid regulatory system created a situation ripe for 
capture by members of the financial industry. If banks regulated by the 
OCC looked favorably at the regulatory terrain offered by the OTS, they 
simply re-chartered as thrifts to migrate from OCC to OTS jurisdiction. Re-
chartering created incentives for the OCC to “compete” with the regulatory 
package offered to thrifts by the OTS so that it could retain its bank 
“clients” and perhaps even encourage some thrifts to re-charter as banks 
and come under the OCC’s umbrella. While in most markets competition is 
a force that benefits consumers, competition between the OCC and OTS 
instead created incentives for a regulatory “race to the bottom”—a race to 
see who could regulate less.57 
State regulators did not face the same misincentives. Indeed, states’ 
attorneys general learned that political capital might be earned in the eyes of 
the electorate (particularly the electorate in “blue states” like New York and 
                                                                                                                                  51. See, e.g., Gene & Gene LLC v. Biopay LLC, 541 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying class 
certification because the action did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class 
certification).  
 52. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 162 (concluding that OCC and OTS 
preemption rules “turned the playing field into one ‘with no rules’”).  
 53. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 54. See id. at 7, 22, 37 (positing that overregulation creates a “disincentive to address social 
ills” when “a social ill is juxtaposed against a fragmented or overlapping legal or political 
setting”).  
 55. Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 159–162 
(describing the process of “charter shopping” by financial industry actors).  
 56. Barkow, supra note 11, at 44.  
 57. Id. at 44–45, 45 n.164.  
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Illinois) if they succeeded in beating up on subprime lenders. They looked 
to bring suit against consumer lenders, but found they had more luck suing 
insurance companies than banks. OCC and OTS preemption regulations 
created high hurdles to states’ action.58 State regulators brought litigation 
that challenged the authority of the OCC and OTS to issue preemption 
regulations—suits that eventually found their way to the Supreme Court—
but this litigation was extremely time consuming and initially unsuccessful. 
State banking authorities lost in Watters, the first such suit.59 State attorneys 
general fared much better, prevailing in Cuomo on a slightly different issue, 
but did not achieve this victory until 2010—well too late to prevent the 
subprime mortgage crisis from spreading to create havoc in other financial 
markets.60 In the interim, the crisis had burned unchecked by either federal 
regulators or their state counterparts. Attorneys general did not become a 
source of regulatory enforcement until after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Cuomo and after the enactment of Dodd-Frank. 
Thus, while there were more than a half-dozen federal regulators with 
jurisdiction to enforce the federal consumer finance laws,61 none did so 
until after the subprime mortgage crisis grew to become a prime mortgage 
crisis, and then a liquidity crisis that has, since at least late 2008, triggered a 
systemic financial crisis of truly global proportion. Given this distaste for 
enforcement of the federal consumer finance laws, bureaucrats’ disinterest 
in promulgating stronger consumer financial protection regulation also 
became clear. As noted above, the FTC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and 
prudential regulators might have issued regulations to clarify whether (or 
when) certain terms in subprime mortgages created unfair or deceptive 
lending practices.62 Consumer advocates had long pressed for this sort of 
regulation, 63  but regulators did nothing until 2008, when high rates of 
default in subprime mortgages were on the cusp of creating a crisis in that 
and other markets. Moreover, when the Agencies did act, they first issued a 
                                                                                                                                
 58. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2011). 
 59. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007). 
 60. Cuomo v. The Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721–22 (2009). 
 61. 12 C.F.R. app. I, § 226 (listing agencies responsible for enforcing the Truth in Lending 
Act); 12 C.F.R. § 227.1(c) (listing agencies responsible for enforcing the Unfair or Deceptive Acts 
or Practices Act); see also CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2.  
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2011) (enabling FTC to promulgate rules, policy statements, and 
definitions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce); 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1818(b)(1), (e)(1), (i) (Federal Reserve Board and FDIC authority); 12 C.F.R. pt. 535 (2011) 
(OTS authority); 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. C (OCC guidelines for establishing standards for 
residential mortgage lending).  
 63. See, e.g., CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION 
IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), 
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. See generally Bar-Gil & 
Warren, supra note 21 (advocating for a new federal regulating agency to improve the safety of 
the consumer credit industry). 
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non-binding recommendation rather than binding regulations.64 While the 
Fed also held exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate regulations under the 
Truth in Lending Act and might have amended Regulation Z to beef up 
disclosures associated with residential mortgage lending, especially high-
priced residential mortgages, it did not issue proposed revisions to the 
Regulation Z mortgage rules until 2009, well too late to staunch the flames 
of the subprime mortgage crisis.65 
II. THE CFPB’S INDEPENDENCE 
Dodd-Frank instills in the CFPB independence both from industry 
actors and political forces looking to undermine the Bureau’s mission of 
consumer protection.66 Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau as 
an “independent,” “autonomous” Bureau within the Federal Reserve.67 Its 
autonomy from the Fed’s Board of Governors is assured by statute. Dodd-
Frank expressly provides that the Board may not “intervene in any matter or 
proceeding before the Director.”68 Similarly, no rule or order of the Bureau 
is subject to approval or review of the Board of Governors; the Board also 
cannot delay or prevent the issuance of such a rule.69 Nor can the Board 
intervene in the CFPB’s examination or enforcement actions.70 
Dodd-Frank designed the Bureau to be independent, not just from the 
Fed, but also from other financial regulators, at least up to a point. 
Independence is sought both structurally and financially. 71  The CFPB’s 
financial independence substantially insulates it from political and industry 
forces, but assuring the Bureau a steady source of funding does not alone 
guarantee its independence. The CFPB is designed in a way that 
distinguishes between its rulemaking and its enforcement authority. 
Because Dodd-Frank grants exclusive rulemaking authority to the CFPB, 
the Bureau is most independent as relates to the writing of new regulations. 
Because the Act divides authority to enforce this regulation among federal 
                                                                                                                                
 64. See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through 
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation & Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 509–13 
(2009).  
 65. Regulation Z, 74 Fed. Reg. 43232 (Aug. 26, 2009) proposed amendment to 12 C.F.R. pt. 
226) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1, 226.4, 226.17, 226.18, 226.19, 226.20, 226.32, 226.36, 
226.37, 226.38, (2010)).  
 66. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 72. 
 67. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011(a), 1012(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–65 
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a), 5492(c) (2010)). 
 68. Id. § 1012(c)(2) (providing further that the Board may not “appoint, direct, or remove any 
officer or employee of the Bureau . . . or merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the functions 
or responsibilities of the Bureau, with any division or office of the Board of Governors or the 
Federal reserve banks”). 
 69. Id. § 1012(c)(3). 
 70. Id. § 1012(c)(2)(A). 
 71. See generally Barkow, supra note 11 (providing the CFPB as an example of an agency that 
has achieved independence through both structural and financial design).  
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and state agents,72 however, the CFPB will at times be required to rely on 
other regulators, thus importantly encroaching on the Bureau’s indepen-
dence. 
In enacting Dodd-Frank and creating the CFPB, Congress accepted the 
claim that authority to promulgate consumer financial protection regulation 
should be granted to a single federal regulator with exclusive jurisdiction 
concerning all federal consumer finance laws and over all consumer lenders 
and other related “covered persons.” Rather than continuing to divide this 
jurisdiction among the FTC and an assortment of federal and state 
prudential regulators, Dodd-Frank grants the Bureau “exclusive” authority 
to promulgate regulations on fourteen specified “federal consumer financial 
laws.”73 It also grants the Bureau additional authority to “prescribe rules 
and issue orders and guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to 
enable” it to “administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the 
Federal consumer financial laws.”74 In addition, it permits the Bureau to 
issue regulations “identifying as unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or abusive” all 
“acts or practices in connection with any transaction” by a “covered person 
or service provider”75 with a consumer for a “consumer financial product or 
service.”76 Jurisdiction to regulate “unfair” and “deceptive” practices had 
existed before Dodd-Frank, although this jurisdiction had been rarely used; 
jurisdiction to regulate “abusive” practices was relatively new, but not 
unprecedented in consumer protection regulation.77 
                                                                                                                                
 72. Dodd Frank Act § 1042(a), 124 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552) (authorizing 
state enforcement power); id. §§ 1025(c)(3), (e), 1026(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991, 1994 (codified at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(c)(3), (e), 5516(d)(1)) (authorizing federal agencies’ enforcement power).  
 73. Id. § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. § 1031(b), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). The Dodd-Frank Act 
defines a “covered person” as “any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer 
financial product or service,” as well as “any affiliate of” or “service provider to” such person. Id. 
§ 1002(6), 124 Stat. at 1956 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). This term includes those offering a 
“private education loan” or “consumer payday loan.” Id. § 1024(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). It also includes “a larger participant of a market for other consumer financial 
products or services.” Id. § 1024(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1987. While the breadth of the term “larger 
participant” is left undefined by Dodd-Frank, the Act also authorizes the Bureau, after 
consultation with the FTC, to promulgate regulations defining this term. Id. § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. 
at 1987. On July 20, 2012, the CFPB issued its Final Rule on Defining Larger Participants. 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1090, 77 Fed. Reg. 42874 (July 20, 2012). This rule became effective on September 30, 
2012. Id. at 42874.  
 76. For definitions of “consumer financial product or service” and “financial product or 
service,” see Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(5), (15), 124 Stat. at 1956, 1957–58 (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5481). 
 77. For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits specified “abusive” 
collection practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2011). For a recent article on the breadth of the 
CFPB’s jurisdiction of “abusive” practices, see Carey Alexander, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 
1031 and the Continuous Struggle to Protect Consumers, ST. JOHN'S LEGAL STUD. RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES, Mar. 2011 (paper no. 10-193), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719600.  
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Congress also accepted, up to a point, the claim that enforcement 
authority should be housed in a single federal regulator. While the CFPB 
now enjoys exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over “too-big-to-fail” banks 
with “total assets in excess of $10 billion” and nondepository “covered 
persons,”78 Dodd-Frank leaves all enforcement authority over banks, credit 
unions, and other financial institutions “with total assets of $10 billion or 
less” with their prudential regulators. 79  Thus, the CFPB holds primary 
enforcement authority because it has exclusive authority over too-big-to-fail 
banks; however, enforcement as to the greatest number of banks—those not 
too big to fail—falls on the prudential regulators. Should these regulators 
fail to enforce the federal consumer financial laws against depository 
lenders, Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB supplemental enforcement 
authority.80 And as to nondepository consumer lenders, Dodd-Frank grants 
exclusive enforcement authority to the CFPB. 81  Moreover, Dodd-Frank 
governs other tertiary members of the financial services industry—
mortgage servicers, for example, and debt collectors. The CFPB holds 
exclusive enforcement authority over these “covered persons,” who, before 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, might have been subject to FTC or other 
jurisdiction.82 The dividing line between persons remaining subject to FTC 
jurisdiction and those “covered” by the CFPB remains less than clear cut 
under Dodd-Frank; nonetheless, the Act directs the Bureau and the FTC to 
negotiate “an agreement for coordinating with respect to enforcement 
actions by each agency.”83 
The logic of aggregating regulatory authority and some enforcement 
authority in the Bureau is fairly simple: predatory subprime mortgages were 
left virtually unregulated by federal agencies, who viewed mortgage lenders 
as their “clients” rather than as the subjects of regulatory authority; lenders 
“chose” their registration in large part by choosing the regulator that 
presented the slimmest set of regulations or that sought to “deregulate” 
through preemption of state enforcement action.84 Lenders would not have 
                                                                                                                                
 78. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(a)(1), (c), 124 Stat. at 1990–91 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515). 
 79. Id. § 1026, 124 Stat. at 1993 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516). 
 80. Id. § 1026(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 1994 (requiring the prudential regulator to respond to written 
notices from the CFPB in situations where the CFPB believes there has been a material violation 
of a Federal consumer financial law). Dodd-Frank also narrows preemption in this context so that 
state regulators might find a toe-hold. See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer 
Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1273, 1299 (2011).  
 81. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(c), 124 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
 82. Id. § 1024(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
 83. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1989. For discussion of the Memorandum of 
Understanding reached between the CFPB and FTC, see Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade 
Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Pledge to Work Together to Protect 
Consumers (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/ftccfpb.shtm. 
 84. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45 (noting the “unhealthy” competition between 
the OCC and OTS in “attract[ing] regulated entities to charter with them to gain their operating 
fees” by “us[ing] their regulatory authority to preempt state consumer protection laws that would 
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been able to choose among regulators if a single regulator had been charged 
with consumer financial protection. Arguably, this regulatory competition 
facilitated agencies’ “capture” by the industries they regulated.85 Whether 
captured or simply suffering from denial, Congress placed some portion of 
blame for the subprime mortgage crisis on the backs of federal regulators by 
shifting authority to the new Bureau. 
Moreover, Congress learned that capture might occur as much through 
inaction as action. 86  Granting the CFPB exclusive rulemaking authority 
does not guarantee that the Bureau will use this jurisdiction. Agency action 
depends both on the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction as well as the will of 
its governing body to regulate. An agency governing by a bipartisan panel 
of commissioners might find itself internally deadlocked on whether and 
how to proceed on regulatory action. In order to ensure that the Bureau was 
not constrained by this sort of internal deadlock, Dodd-Frank structured the 
CFPB so that it would be headed by a single, independent Director 
appointed for a term of years.87  
Commentators note that agency appointments for a term of years are 
intended to permit appointees both to develop expertise on technical 
subjects and to take “politically unpopular action.” 88  Unlike other 
presidential appointments, which serve at the pleasure of the President and 
might be removed on the basis of interest group influence, the Director, as 
an appointee for a term of years, cannot be removed except “for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”89 Once appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Director guides 
the CFPB for a five-year term.90 This term of years, thus, helps to protect 
the Bureau from presidential interference after a Director has been 
appointed.91  Politically unpopular actions might be taken by a Director 
appointed for a term of years because presidential influence occurs in the 
choice of the Director but is substantially less following appointment. In 
                                                                                                                                
otherwise govern the activities” of these regulated entities); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 20. 
 85. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 164; Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45. 
 86. Cf. Barkow, supra note 11, at 37–41 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a 
multimember commission over that of a single agency head).  
 87. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).  
 88. Barkow, supra note 11, at 29. 
 89. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1964–65 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 90. A Director sits until the next Director is appointed by the President and approved by the 
Senate. Id. § 1011(c), 124 Stat. at 1964. Legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act makes clear 
that Congress carefully considered alternate designs for the Bureau but decided that a single 
director would better serve its intent. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 21, at 696. 
 91. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 29–30 (suggesting that the term of years “removal 
restriction undoubtedly gives an agency head greater confidence to challenge presidential 
pressure”).  
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turn, longevity, expertise, and political independence also minimize the 
possibility of industry capture.92  
While Dodd-Frank provides that the CFPB’s Director cannot be 
removed once appointed, it does not completely insulate the Bureau from 
presidential influence. Presidential influence comes, ex ante, in the choice 
of the individual nominated to hold the position of Director. Indeed, that the 
Director sits for a five-year term means that most Presidents will influence 
policy-making on consumer financial protection for a period that extends 
beyond his own four-year term of office. As a result, this single-director 
design gives the President that appoints a Director far more influence than 
Congress. It should come as no surprise that the most controversial thing 
about the CFPB is that a single director heads the Bureau rather than a 
board of bipartisan commissioners with staggered terms. 93  While the 
Bureau is not the only independent administrative agency in Washington, 
D.C., it is the only independent agency headed by a single director.94 When 
critics argue that the CFPB lacks accountability, they point to the fact that 
the Bureau is run by a single director rather than a board of 
commissioners.95 
The Bureau is also made financially independent by statute; this 
financial independence, again, removes an aspect of congressional authority 
over the CFPB.96 Once the Director determines the amount “reasonably 
necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau under federal consumer 
financial law,”97 that amount is payable out of the coffers of the Federal 
Reserve. While Dodd-Frank sets a statutory cap on the portion of the Fed’s 
budget available to the CFPB,98 estimates place this amount at almost twice 
that of the FTC’s annual budget and about half that of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).99 The CFPB, thus, need not go to Congress 
each year in search of an appropriation. The statute expressly provides that 
the Director’s request for funding “shall not be subject to review by the 
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
                                                                                                                                
 92. See generally id. at 28–30.   93. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 2123, 2126.  
 94. See RICHARD PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS 101 (5th ed. 2009). 
 95. See Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable “Consumer-Protection” Czar, 
WALL ST. J., July 21, 2011, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424053111903554904576457931310814462.html.   96. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 2125–26.  
 97. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1017(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2010)). 
 98. Dodd-Frank provides that the Bureau is entitled to receive not more than 10 to 12 percent 
of the Fed’s annual budget. Id. § 1017(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1975. 
 99. National Consumer Law Center, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Bureau 
Structure, Independence and Funding, 29 NCLC REPORTS 6 (July/August 2010) (“The CFPB’s 
budget will be set by the CFPB’s Director, up to a cap of about $485 million in 2013, adjusted for 
inflation thereafter. By comparison, the Federal Trade Commission’s 2009 budget was $281 
million and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s was $961 million.”). 
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Senate.”100 While the Bureau’s budgets are subject to audit by the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Comptroller General of the United 
States, 101  these simply require the CFPB to account transparently for 
expenditures after the fact; it does not limit the amount or type of 
expenditures. 
Almost from the day it was created with the enactment of Dodd-Frank, 
the CFPB’s independence opened it to criticisms of unaccountability. The 
timing of this controversy bears emphasis, because immediate and 
vociferous opposition to the Bureau made it appear as though the CFPB 
was forced on Congress—as though Congress did not enact legislation to 
create the CFPB. But Dodd-Frank was enacted in mid-2010 just prior to 
midterm elections during the Obama Administration. By late 2010, 
disgruntled voters ensured that Democrats would no longer hold a majority 
in both houses of Congress.102 The Tea Party emerged initially in reaction to 
the Obama Administration’s handling of the bailout of large financial 
institutions, but also found much to complain about in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Although political power did not shift until after enactment of Dodd-
Frank and after midterm elections, Congress was surely not unaware of 
these shifting political winds when it designed the CFPB as an independent 
agency. The Bureau was structured with the expectation that it would need 
to withstand immediate and fierce political resistance. It was designed to be 
independent from both industry and political influence—from both 
executive and congressional pressure. 
Bills were introduced in the House almost immediately following 
midterm elections during the Obama Administration. Some, like that 
introduced by Rep. Michele Bachman, sought to repeal Dodd-Frank in 
toto. 103  Other bills introduced in the House tinkered around the edges, 
looking to effect changes in the governance structure of the CFPB or the 
burden of proof to be met before regulating.104 There were similar bills 
                                                                                                                                
 100. Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1976 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497). 
 101. Id. § 1017(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1976. 
 102. Jeff A. Boehner, G.O.P. Captures House, but Not Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03elect.html.  
 103. H.R. 87, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Rep. Michele Bachman on January 5, 2011 to 
repeal Dodd-Frank Act); see also S. 712, 112st Cong. (2011) (Financial Takeover Repeal Act of 
2011); S. 746, 112st Cong. (2011) (Dodd-Frank Repeal Act of 2011). 
 104. H.R. 557, 112th Cong. (2011) (transferring CFPB from Federal Reserve to Department of 
Treasury and prohibiting Director of Treasury from interfering with new Bureau’s autonomy, but 
cut off Bureau from financial benefits of Fed relationship); H.R. 480, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(amending Truth in Lending Act to prohibit residential mortgage credit to consumers who lack 
social security numbers); H.R 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (replacing single director of CFPB with 
five-member commission composed of Vice Chairman of Federal Reserve plus four additional 
presidential appointees); H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011) (Consumer Financial Protection Safety 
and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011); H.R. 1355, 112th Cong. (2011) (Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection Accountability and Transparency Act of 2011); H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (subjecting CFPB to appropriations process and repeal its access to Federal Reserve 
funds); H.R. 2612, 112th Cong. (2011) (repealing authority of CFPB to prohibit unfair, deceptive, 
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introduced in the Senate as well.105 The Senate bills went nowhere, given 
the Democratic majority in that house of Congress, but the House of 
Representatives held hearings106 and reported out several of its bills.107 In July 
21, 2011, just prior to the CFPB’s start date, the House passed H.R. 1315.108 
While the Senate did not move forward either on the bills introduced 
there or on the legislation previously enacted in the House, it held an 
important card in thwarting the President’s ability to influence consumer 
protection policy. Because the Director of the CFPB required the Senate’s 
consent, a minority of Senators threatened filibuster and succeeded in 
preventing appointment of a Director through normal means.109 At first, 
President Obama engineered around this threatened filibuster by appointing 
Elizabeth Warren as a Consumer Czar,110 a position that required no Senate 
approval; 111  but after the CFPB “went live” in July 2011, argument 
circulated that the Bureau could not accomplish much of anything without a 
Director. 112  Although by then President Obama had nominated Richard 
Cordray for the position of Director (rather than Elizabeth Warren), 
                                                                                                                                
and abusive practices and promulgate regulations to prevent such practices); H.R. 4014, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (making CFPB a “covered agency”); H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011) (altering 
“transfer date” under Dodd-Frank Act so that CFPB would not “go live” until confirmation of 
director by Senate); H.R. 3044, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank Act to repeal Office 
of Financial Research). 
 105. S. 2160, 112th Cong. (2012) (Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform 
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(2012) (requiring CFPB to conduct a small business review panel on qualified mortgage rule); S. 
1615, 112th Cong. (2011) (Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011). 
 106. See, e.g., Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 
(2011), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-18.pdf.  
 107. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ACT OF 2011, H.R. REP. 
NO. 89-112 (May 25, 2011) (reporting on H.R. 1315).  
 108.  Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 – 2012) H.R.1315 - All Information, 
THOMAS, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2011/h621? (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  
 109. Whitehouse, President Obama News Conference, YOUTUBE (Sep. 10, 2010) at 22:15, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvwB0guyuNk&cc=1#t=1339s. 
 110.  Brady Dennis & Scott Wilson, Warren Takes Post; Liberals Cheer, WASH. POST, Sept. 
18, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/17 
/AR2010091706828.html.  
 111. Presidential appointment of regulatory czars did not begin with Elizabeth Warren. Because 
czars report only to the President and often are appointed to get around Senate confirmation fights, 
their authority is contested, both politically and constitutionally. For debate on the legality and 
wisdom of regulatory czars, see Jacqueline M. Weyand, Presidential Appointment of Czars: 
Executive Power Play or Administrative Renewal?, 3 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 120 (2010); Aaron 
J. Saiger, Obama’s ‘Czars’ for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011). 
 112. Although consumer advocates argued that this claim was based on a faulty reading of 
Dodd-Frank’s provisions, see Lauren Saunders, Hurdle for Challengers to CFPB Recess 
Appointment: Consumer Bureau Had Full Power With or Without a Director, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR. (February 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/regulatory_reform/issue-brief-cfpb 
-interim-powers.pdf, few in the CFPB wanted to test the breadth of their regulatory authority 
given the ideological slant of this Supreme Court. 
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Republican members of the Senate announced that they would filibuster 
any nominee for the position.113 
Between July 2011 and January 2012, the CFPB worked under this 
cloud of uncertainty. On January 4, 2012, Obama appointed Cordray to the 
position under his Recess Appointment powers, although the Senate 
technically had not recessed for its usual year-end break.114  
Whether Cordray was properly appointed as Director of the CFPB is, 
thus, itself subject to question.115 The constitutionality of his appointment, 
as well as the CFPB’s regulatory and Directorial action since that 
appointment, are sharply contested. In June 2012, suit was brought seeking 
declaration that Cordray’s appointment and, indeed, the whole of Dodd-
Frank are unconstitutional.116 The CFPB and other defendants moved to 
dismiss the suit in late 2012.117 Although the court has yet to rule on the suit 
pending against the CFPB, it has ruled on a similar suit brought against the 
NLRB. In Noel Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently struck down the NLRB’s adjudication on the grounds that these 
appointments were neither approved by the Senate nor authorized by the 
Recess Appointments Clause.118 While the facts of the case pending against 
the CFPB are distinguishable, commentators question whether Cordray’s 
appointment as Director will withstand constitutional scrutiny.119 President 
Obama recently nominated Cordray for a five-year term as Director.120 
While Senate approval of Cordray’s “re-appointment” would resolve 
questions regarding the Director’s status going forward, there remains the 
question of regulation and Directorial action previously taken by the CFPB. 
Commentators differ, except on the notion that litigation is likely.121 
                                                                                                                                  113. 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, SHELBY.SENATE.GOV (May 
5, 2011), http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/44-u-s-sens-to-obama-no 
-accountability-no-confirmation.    114. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordray 
-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.    115. See V. Gerard Comizio & Amanda M. Jabour, Cordray’s Recess Appointment: Future 
Legal Challenges, ABA BANKING L. COMM. J., Mar. 2012, http://apps.americanbar.org 
/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201203/comizio-jabour.pdf.  
 116. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. 
Geithner, No. 1:12_CV-01032, 2012 WL 2365284 (D.D.C. Jun. 21, 2012). 
 117. Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Moves to Dismiss Case Challenging Director Cordray’s Recess 
Appointment, CFPB MONITOR (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2012/11/27/cfpb 
-moves-to-dismiss-case-challenging-director-cordrays-recess-appointment/. 
 118. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 12-1153, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 119. See Levitin, supra note 8. 
  120. Ben Protess & Benjamin Weiser, Obama’s Picks for Regulators Send a Message to Wall 
Street, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013 
/01/24/mary-jo-white-to-be-named-new-s-e-c-boss/?hp. 
 121. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
2012] Accountability and the CFPB 43 
III. THE CFPB’S ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Dodd-Frank Act describes the CFPB as an “autonomous” bureau in 
the Federal Reserve System, “independent” from both the Fed and other 
administrative agencies.122 This description of the CFPB is coupled with 
provisions in Dodd-Frank that free the Bureau from the congressional 
appropriations process; because the budget of the CFPB is payable from 
revenue of the Federal Reserve, Congress cannot control the Bureau by 
threatening to decrease or eliminate funding.123 
Nonetheless, the CFPB sits in a regulatory space it shares with other 
regulators. While the CFPB is more independent than most administrative 
agencies, the Bureau holds institutional obligations to Congress, the FTC, 
and the prudential regulators, including the newly created Council on 
Financial Stability (the Council). While the FTC and prudential regulators 
do not hold veto power over the Bureau, both Congress and the Council can 
set aside CFPB regulation.124 Reversal is not as simple as some would like. 
Nonetheless, the Bureau is, in important ways, accountable to these 
officials. 
Table 1 summarizes this statutory division of labor. It categorizes the 
CFPB’s accountability according to source (congressional, prudential 
regulators, FTC, and the Council) and subject (rulemaking, supervision and 
monitoring of depository institutions, enforcement, and oversight). 
TABLE 1: CFPB OVERSIGHT AND OVERLAPPING REGULATORY 
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN DODD-FRANK 
 Council Congress Prudential 
and other 
regulators 
FTC 
Rulemaking Section 
1023 
 Sections 
1015, 1022 
Section 1022 
Supervision, 
Monitoring 
  Sections 
1025, 1026 
Sections 
1024, 1027, 
1029 
Enforcement   Sections 
1025, 1026 
Sections 
1024, 1027, 
1029 
Oversight  Sections 
1016, 1013 
  
 
                                                                                                                                
 122. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011, 1012, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–66 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492, 5493 (2010)). 
 123. Nor can Congress indirectly control the budget of the CFPB by cutting the budget of the 
Fed. Id. § 1017(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1975 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497). 
 124. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). 
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Because references in the table are merely statutory provisions within 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Table’s complicated summary requires 
elaboration. These statutory provisions are described below. 
A. RULEMAKING 
Dodd-Frank provides that the Director has broad authority to “prescribe 
rules and issue orders and guidance.”125 Although this rulemaking authority 
is “exclusive,”126 it is subject to specific burdens of proof set out in the 
Act.127 The Bureau’s rulemaking authority is also tempered by procedural 
requirements set in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 128  which 
govern all administrative agencies’ rulemaking, including that by the CFPB. 
Because the APA requires notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunities 
for public comment by interested actors (whether industry or consumer 
advocates),129 it provides a sort of intellectual roadmap of interest groups’ 
influence in the process.130 
The CFPB’s exclusive rulemaking authority is also subject to oversight 
by other financial regulators. Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to “consult 
with the appropriate prudential regulators or other Federal agencies prior to 
proposing a rule,”131 and, where regulators object to its proposals during the 
comment phase of rulemaking, to publish these written objections.132 While 
neither private actors nor prudential regulators can veto the Bureau’s 
proposed regulation, it would be a mistake to conclude that the CFPB can 
simply ignore their regulatory commentary. Moreover, Dodd-Frank subjects 
the Bureau to the possibility that its financial regulations will be “stayed” or 
“set aside” by the Council.133 These limits, as well as the regulatory burdens 
of proof, are each discussed in turn. 
1. Burdens of Proof  
Several regulatory burdens of proof built into Dodd-Frank are likely to 
inhibit CFPB regulation on a given topic. Like many agencies, the CFPB 
must assess the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation.134 A cost-
                                                                                                                                
 125. Id. § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 126. Id. § 1022(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 1981. 
 127. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.  
 128. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2011)).  
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2011).  
 130. Political scientists view the APA as providing Congress with an important source of 
information about agency policy making. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 25, at 94–97.  
 131. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 132. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1981. 
 133. Id. § 1023(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). 
 134. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (requiring the 
Bureau to consider “the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including 
the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial products or services 
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benefit equation that compares concentrated costs to diffuse benefits is 
likely to overemphasize costs over benefits simply because diffuse benefits 
will be more difficult to quantify, and Dodd-Frank is not distinct in this 
regard.135 Moreover, when regulating unfair, deceptive, or abusive prac-
tices, Dodd-Frank overlays a second cost-benefit analysis. It defines 
“unfair” to require the Bureau to conclude that the questionable practice “is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers” that is not “reasonably 
avoidable by consumers” and “is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits.”136 Similarly, the Act defines “abusive” practices as limited to 
those “materially” interfering with “the ability of a consumer to understand 
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service,” or that take 
“unreasonable advantage” consumers.137 Thus, high burdens of proof limit 
the Bureau’s grant of regulatory authority.  
Relying on these statutorily imposed burdens, political and industry 
interests can work to push back against an independent CFPB. For example, 
Dodd-Frank defines key terms such as “unfair” and “abusive” in ways that 
allow for arguments by industry that a practice may be problematic but not 
sufficiently problematic to justify regulation.138 More importantly, section 
1022(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to consider “the 
potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including 
the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial 
products of services resulting from such rule.”139 Because this cost-benefit 
analysis requires a balancing of concentrated costs and diffuse costs against 
diffuse benefits, it seems to favor a finding that costs exceed benefits. That 
conservative analysts criticize regulations recently proposed by the CFPB 
as failing to satisfy this standard supports a conclusion that this cost-benefit 
                                                                                                                                
resulting from such rule”); id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring consideration of “the impact on . . . 
covered persons” and “on consumers in rural areas”). 
  135.  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and the Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 65 (2011); see also supra notes 17–18 and accompanying 
text. 
 136. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
 137. Id. § 1031(d), 124 Stat. at 2006. 
 138. Dodd-Frank’s definitions are far from bright-line rules. Dodd-Frank provides that an act or 
practice is unfair when it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers [and] such substantial injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” Id. § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 
(emphasis added). It similarly defines an abusive act or practice as one that “materially interferes 
with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product 
or service [or] takes unreasonable advantage of” a consumer’s lack of understanding, the inability 
of the consumer to protect his own interests, or the “reasonable reliance by the consumer on a 
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.” Id. § 1031(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 
(emphasis added).  
 139. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
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analysis favors industry interests, and may suggest the possibility of future 
litigation on this basis.140 
2. Regulatory “Consultation”  
Dodd-Frank requires the Bureau to “consult” with the appropriate 
prudential regulators or other federal agencies prior to proposing a rule and 
during the comment process “regarding the consistency with prudential, 
market, or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.” 141  This 
section further provides that a prudential regulator may submit a “written 
objection” to the proposed rule;142 if it does so, the Bureau must include in 
its adopting release “a description of the objection and the basis for the 
Bureau’s decision, if any, regarding this objection.”143 
While these provisions do not grant prudential regulators or other 
federal agencies a veto on the Bureau’s proposed regulation, pragmatic 
consequences would likely follow the requirement that the CFPB record 
both the competing regulator’s written objection and its response in the 
regulatory record. Depending on circumstances, the Bureau may look to 
avoid this public critique by anticipating and addressing such objections 
before dueling paperwork is submitted to the public record. 
The precise contours and implications of this interagency consultation 
requirement are still somewhat opaque. Interagency regulatory consultation 
obligations are not unique to the CFPB. On one hand, a statute may include 
a purely discretionary statement that one agency “may consult” with 
another;144 on the other hand, a statute might mandate that two agencies 
engage in joint rulemaking.145 Between these two extremes lie statutes that 
“require consultation before an agency can take certain actions, even though 
how an agency should treat the substance of the interaction remains highly 
discretionary.”146 
Dodd-Frank fits in this grey zone. While it requires the CFPB to consult 
with the “appropriate” regulators before proposing new consumer financial 
                                                                                                                                
 140. See, e.g., Mark A. Calabria, The CFPB: Problem of Solution?, CATO INST., http://www 
.cato.org/publications/commentary/cfpb-problem-or-solution (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).  
 141. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 142. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1981. 
 143. Id. But see id. § 1022(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (specifying “the deference that a court 
affords to the Bureau” should be “as if the Bureau were the only agency authorized to apply, 
enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial law”). 
 144. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1157 (citing to section 3 of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(3) (2011), “which provides that when 
considering any application for pesticide registration, the EPA Administrator ‘may consult’ with 
any other federal agency”). 
 145. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1165–73 (discussing joint rulemaking). 
 146. Id. at 1158 (describing section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, “which requires federal 
agencies to consult with the federal fish and wildlife agencies responsible for administering the 
Act to ensure that their proposed major actions are ‘not likely to jeopardize’ protected species”). 
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protection regulations and “during the comment process”;147 it does not 
require the Bureau to defer to another regulator’s determination that the 
proposed rule would be inconsistent with the “prudential, market, or 
systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”148 It merely requires 
that written objections be included in the regulatory record. Nonetheless, 
similar purely procedural requirements of consultation have been described 
as imposing “a powerful interagency lever”149 on the grounds that, although 
the principal agency retains considerable discretion, in practice this sort of 
provision “can function as a veto because disregarding recommendations 
can expose an agency to civil and criminal penalties and because deviation 
may render a decision arbitrary and capricious on judicial review.” 150 
Whether Dodd-Frank will be construed in this way remains an open 
question, but the CFPB is likely to avoid litigation of the issue by trying to 
reach agreement before a written objection is lodged. 
Interagency consultation can advance both congressional and 
presidential interests. Requirements that agencies consult each other before 
regulating can establish “a monitoring mechanism that can supplement 
congressional oversight.” 151  It might, at the same time, “bolster the 
President’s power by creating an avenue through which agencies might 
‘lobby’ each other to advance the President’s prerogatives.”152 Importantly, 
this sort of shared regulatory space can challenge industry influence 
because interest groups are required to assert influence in multiple locations 
simultaneously. In the case of financial regulation, where this influence can 
concentrate either on promoting favorable or resisting unfavorable 
regulation, containing capture could be more difficult than with other issue 
areas, even within a shared regulatory space, since benefits or costs are 
particularly concentrated and industry interests are particularly powerful 
and well financed.  
3. Regulatory Stay and Set Aside  
Dodd-Frank also creates a sort of “super prudential regulator”—the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council.153 The Act grants the Council juris-
                                                                                                                                
 147. The reference to “comment process” undoubtedly refers to the requirements of the APA, 
including 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
 149. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1158; see also Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: 
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52–
57 (2009). 
 150. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1158. The Supreme Court has agreed with Freeman 
and Rossi’s pragmatic assessment. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (“[W]hile the 
Service’s Biological Opinion theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ . . . in reality it has a 
powerful coercive effect on the action agency . . . .”). 
 151. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1160. 
 152. Id. at 1160–61. 
 153. Dodd-Frank Act § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392–93 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The members 
of the Council include the Secretary of the Treasury (who serves as Chairperson), the Chairman of 
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diction both to stay implementation of regulations promulgated by the 
Bureau and, ultimately, to “set aside” or veto its rules.154 The standard for 
“set aside” is high. Dodd-Frank permits this extreme remedy only if the 
Council decides “that the regulation or provision [of a regulation] would put 
the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the 
stability of the financial system of the United States at risk.”155 Moreover, a 
decision of the Council—a group of nine regulators and one presidential 
appointee—to set aside a regulation on this basis can be made “only with 
the affirmative vote” of “two thirds of the members of the Council.”156 
Unlike the consultation requirements discussed above, the Council does 
hold a veto power. Council interference with the regulatory authority of the 
CFPB can occur with the concurrence of seven members of the Council.157 
Although, the standard for a Council set aside is high, in all likelihood, the 
Council’s determination would be subject to Chevron deference.158 Would a 
court substitute its own judgment for that of the Council that the 
complained of regulation threatens the safety and soundness of the U.S. 
banking system or the financial stability of the U.S. financial system? If so, 
the pragmatic implications of this authority are probably far wider than the 
narrow parameters set forth in the statute and almost undoubtedly reach 
back to any written objection filed during the comment process if submitted 
by an agency with a seat on the Council. 
This potential for regulatory veto provides enormous opportunity for 
executive influence on the CFPB’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. 
Many of the Council seats are themselves presidential appointees and are, 
thus, unlikely to vote contrary to the President’s wishes. The very public 
nature of the process through which the Council considers whether to set 
aside a regulation issued by the CFPB also provides each of the members of 
the Council with another opportunity to lobby the Bureau about its policies 
and proposed regulations. Given the likely crisis that a set aside is meant to 
                                                                                                                                
the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the CFPB Director, the SEC Chairman, 
the FDIC Chairperson, the CFTC Chairperson, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and “an independent 
member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having 
insurance expertise.” Id.  
 154. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). The Chair of the Council 
can provisionally stay the effectiveness of a CFPB regulation on request of a single member of the 
Council. Id. § 1023(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1985. This stay is effective for no more than a ninety-day 
period. Id. § 1023(c)(1). The request for a stay and ultimately a set aside of such a regulation is 
related to the consultation requirement specified in section 1023(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985, in 
that a petition for a stay must allege a good faith attempt “to resolve concerns regarding the effect 
of the rule” on safety and soundness or financial stability. Id. § 1023(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985. 
 155. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985.  
 156. Id. § 1023(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985–86. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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avert, behind-the-scenes presidential involvement in the process is also to 
be expected. 
The public nature of this debate also presents Congress with both a 
source of information about the CFPB’s rulemaking and an opportunity for 
involvement. In addition, Congress independently holds authority to reverse 
any regulation promulgated by the CFPB through additional legislation. 
Thus, if the Council fails to set aside a controversial regulation, Congress 
might itself step in and set aside the rule.159 
H.R. 1315, the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness 
Improvement Act (the Improvement Act), would make it easier for the 
Council to veto CFPB regulation by softening the standard for set aside. 
Rather than require a showing that the regulation in question would put the 
safety and soundness of the banking system or the stability of the financial 
system “at risk,” the Council could veto a regulation if it were found to be 
“inconsistent” with the safe and sound operations of this system. 160 
Similarly, rather than require the Council to vote by a two-thirds majority, 
the Improvement Act would set aside a regulation on the basis of a simple 
majority.161 But the difference between the 66 percent currently required for 
reversal and the 50 percent that H.R. 1315 would instead require would 
effect little in practice because each of the members of the Council are 
themselves presidential appointees. While dissent within the Council is 
politically unlikely, even the slimmest possibility of set aside is likely to 
chill CFPB regulatory action. 
B. ENFORCEMENT, EXAMINATION, AND SUPERVISION 
Whatever regulation the CFPB succeeds in issuing, it may need to rely 
on other regulators to enforce them. The CFPB may be the exclusive 
regulator of consumer financial protection, but it must share enforcement 
jurisdiction with a complex assortment of federal and state regulators. This 
section details this shared enforcement authority. 
1. Coordination of Supervision and Enforcement  
Before enactment of Dodd-Frank, regulators competed to determine 
who held exclusive enforcement authority. In notable instances, this was a 
race to the bottom to see who could regulate consumer lenders less.162 
Unlike rulemaking authority, which Dodd-Frank grants exclusively to the 
                                                                                                                                
 159. Of course, legislation reversing a CFPB regulation would require approval by both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate and an absence of presidential veto. If the President were 
to veto such a bill, Congress could still enact such legislation, but with the approval of a veto-
proof supermajority. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 160. Id. § 3.  
 161. Id. § 2.  
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. See generally ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, 
at pt. 3. 
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Bureau, enforcement and supervisory authority remains divided under the 
statute depending on the type of consumer lender at issue. 
Most view the CFPB as the “primary” enforcement agency of consumer 
financial protection regulation.163 But that assessment, while accurate on 
average, glosses over the numerous ways in which the CFPB shares 
enforcement authority. 
a. Very Large Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions  
Dodd-Frank grants the Bureau exclusive supervisory authority over 
“very large banks, savings associations and credit unions,” and “primary” 
authority to “enforce” the federal consumer finance laws against these very 
large banks.164 Its supervisory powers grant the CFPB “exclusive authority” 
to examine very large banks to assess their compliance with the federal 
consumer financial laws and related risk to consumers and markets for 
consumer financial products and services. 165  Since this examination 
authority is limited in scope to the consumer financial laws, however, 
Dodd-Frank creates overlaps in supervisory jurisdiction, which it resolves 
by requiring the CFPB and the prudential regulator to coordinate 
supervision of the “very large banks.”166 
Express authority to enforce laws that have been violated bolsters this 
supervisory authority. Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB “primary authority to 
enforce” the federal consumer financial laws as against very large banks.167 
Because the Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction over very large banks is not 
exclusive, however, Dodd-Frank also specifies the “backup enforcement 
authority” of other federal agencies.168 The Act provides that any federal 
agency other than the FTC can recommend, in writing, to the CFPB that 
they initiate an enforcement proceeding.169  If the CFPB does not bring 
action within 120 days, the other agency can itself commence an 
enforcement proceeding.170 
                                                                                                                                
 163. Barkow, supra note 11, at 76 (“The CFPB has primary enforcement responsibility vis-à-vis 
other federal agencies that may be authorized to bring federal consumer finance actions.”).  
 164. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1025(b)(1), (c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1990, 1991 
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2010)). Very large banks, savings associations, and credit 
unions are defined as those respective entities with total assets exceeding $10 billion. Id.  
§ 1025(a). For distinction between supervisory and enforcement powers, see Cuomo v. The 
Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 (2009). 
 165. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(b)(1)(A), (C), 124 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515). 
 166. Id. § 1025(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991; see also Memorandum of Understanding on 
Supervisory Coordination (May 16, 2012) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents 
/press/bcreg/bcreg20120604a1.pdf (specifying coordination between CFPB and the Prudential 
Regulators regarding enforcement and supervisory actions involving very large banks). 
 167. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515). 
 168. Id. § 1025(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1991. 
 169. Id. § 1025(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1991. 
 170. Id. § 1025(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1991. 
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b. Other Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions  
Dodd-Frank grants to the CFPB examination and enforcement authority 
over banks, savings associations, and credit unions whose total assets are 
$10 billion or less,171 but as to these banks the Bureau’s role is as a backup 
enforcement authority. The Act permits the Director of the CFPB to require 
reports from these not-so-very-large financial institutions, although it 
directs the Bureau to use pre-existing reports or publicly available data “to 
the fullest extent possible.” 172  The CFPB also can audit the primary 
prudential regulator’s examination reports to “assess” the bank’s 
“compliance with the Federal consumer finance laws.”173 
Despite these powers of examination, the CFPB holds no independent 
power of enforcement against these banks. If the CFPB has reason to 
believe “a material violation” of such laws has occurred, it can “notify the 
prudential regulators in writing and recommend appropriate action to 
respond.”174  But, in general, the prudential regulator for these financial 
institutions holds “exclusive authority (relative to the Bureau) to enforce” 
the federal consumer finance laws.175 
While Dodd-Frank attempts to set clear regulatory boundaries between 
the CFPB and these prudential regulators, issues are bound to arise on the 
margins. In anticipation of the potential for dispute regarding these “other 
banks,” the Act also specifies that the CFPB is required to coordinate with 
federal prudential regulators and state bank regulators “to minimize 
regulatory burden.”176 Although nothing in the statute expressly requires 
prudential regulators to maximize their protection of consumers’ financial 
decision making, coordination should be interpreted to minimize the 
regulatory burden of duplicated efforts rather than minimization of 
regulatory effort altogether. It should also be interpreted to minimize the 
possibility that enforcement of the federal consumer financial laws is 
distinct depending on the agency with primary enforcement jurisdiction. 
Large banks with assets in excess of $10 billion should face the same 
enforcement energy as smaller banks with total assets of less than $10 
billion. Dodd-Frank does not answer, however, whether enforcement 
interests of the CFPB or of the other regulators should prevail. 
c. Other Consumer Lenders, Service Providers, and Related 
“Covered Persons”  
In addition, the CFPB’s enforcement authority extends to consumer 
lenders, service providers, and others that are “nondepository covered 
                                                                                                                                
 171. Id. § 1026(a), 124 Stat. at 1993 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516). 
 172. Id. § 1026(b), 124 Stat. at 1994–95. 
 173. Id. § 1026(c), 124 Stat. at 1994. 
 174. Id. § 1026(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 1994. 
 175. Id. § 1026(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1994. 
 176. Id. § 1024(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1988 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). 
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persons.” While the CFPB does not share with any prudential regulator 
enforcement responsibility over these sorts of “covered persons,” it also 
does not hold sole authority over them. As to these “nondepository covered 
persons,” the CFPB shares enforcement authority with the FTC.177 
The contours of this shared regulatory jurisdiction are complex. Dodd-
Frank specifies that the CFPB hold supervisory and enforcement 
jurisdiction over any “covered person” who: 
 “offers or provides origination, brokerage, or servicing” of loans 
secured by residential mortgages, “or loan modification or 
foreclosure relief services in connection with such loans.” 
 “offers or provides to a consumer a private education loan,” or 
 “offers or provides to a consumer a payday loan.”178 
It also specifies that the Bureau has jurisdiction over any “covered 
person” that “is a larger participant of a market for other consumer financial 
products or services,”179 but left specification of this “larger participant” 
concept for later regulation in consultation with the FTC. 180  The final 
“larger participant” regulation became effective early this year.181  
Dodd-Frank provides that the CFPB “shall” require reports and conduct 
periodic examinations of “nondepository covered persons,” 182  but also 
specifies that this examination function should be conducted to “minimize 
regulatory burden”183 and must be coordinated with the federal and state 
prudential regulators exercising supervisory activities. 184  Again, examin-
ation is distinct from enforcement authority. Here, Dodd-Frank grants the 
CFPB “exclusive authority to enforce the Federal consumer financial law” 
relating to these nondepository covered persons.185 Nonetheless, the Act 
permits “[a]ny federal agency authorized to enforce [the] Federal consumer 
financial law” to recommend initiation of an enforcement action.186 It also 
specifically requires the CFPB and FTC to “negotiate an agreement for 
coordinating with respect to enforcement actions by each agency,”187 a task 
the two agencies completed in 2012.188 
                                                                                                                                
 177. Id. § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1989. 
 178. Id. §§ 1024, (a)(1)(A), (D), (E), 124 Stat. at 1987. 
 179. Id. § 1024(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1987. 
 180. Id. § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1987. 
 181. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090, 77 Fed. Reg. 42874 (July 20, 2012) (providing that this final rule is 
to become effective Jan. 2, 2013). 
 182. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). 
 183. Presumably, this standard should be construed consistent with the same standard set in 
section 1024(b)(3). For discussion of this standard, see supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 184. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1988 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). 
 185. Id. § 1024(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1989. 
 186. Id. § 1024(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1989 (providing that this recommendation be in writing). 
 187. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1989. Short of requiring this interagency agreement to be 
negotiated, the Act does not specify whether it would be enforceable or subject to judicial review. 
While Dodd-Frank did not otherwise set the terms of this interagency agreement, it suggests the 
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2. General Duty to Coordinate  
In addition to the consultation and coordination otherwise specified in 
the Act, Dodd-Frank also requires the Bureau to “coordinate” with the SEC, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC), the FTC, and 
other federal agencies and state regulators “as appropriate to promote 
consistent regulatory treatment of consumer financial and investment 
products and services.”189 While it nowhere explicitly defines these duties 
of coordination, duties of coordination presumably differ from the 
consultation requirements otherwise specified in the Act. “Regulatory 
treatment” may refer to coordination of rulemaking authority to avoid 
inconsistent treatment of similar or related market actors, although the 
distinction between permitting consultation and requiring coordination on 
regulation is unclear. “Regulatory treatment” may instead refer to 
coordination of examination and enforcement actions, although Dodd-Frank 
elsewhere specifies similar obligations of coordination. 190  Finally, this 
provision may be construed to permit negotiation of a memorandum of 
understanding with the CFPB, although an express statutory authority to 
enter into an interagency agreement may be unnecessary.191 
C. OVERSIGHT 
1. Congressional Testimony and Reports  
Although Congress does not control the Bureau’s purse strings, Dodd-
Frank nonetheless requires the Bureau to account to Congress annually. It 
requires the Director to provide semiannual testimony at hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, as well as the 
House Committees on Financial Services and on Energy and Commerce, 
where presumably members of Congress will submit their own questions to 
the Director. 192  The Director is also required to provide to these 
congressional committees and to the President “a report” on the Bureau’s 
                                                                                                                                
“rules of the road” to be followed when civil actions are brought either by the Bureau or the FTC. 
Id. § 1024(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1989. The Act also permits the two agencies to “modify or 
supersede” these recommendations by agreement. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1989. 
Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been negotiated between administrative agencies in 
the past, some voluntarily, some required by statute, but “there appears to be no generally 
applicable statutory or executive branch policy regarding the use of MOUs, leaving their content 
largely to the discretion of the agencies.” Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1161. 
 188. Memorandum of Understanding between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 
the Federal Trade Commission (May 16, 2012), http://ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb 
-mou.pdf. 
 189. Dodd-Frank Act § 1015, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5495).   190. See, e.g., id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–31 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (providing that the 
federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the CFTC shall consult and coordinate with each other in 
developing regulations with respect to the “Volcker Rule”).  
 191. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1161. 
 192. Dodd-Frank Act § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496).  
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activities on nine statutorily specified topics 193  and on the consumer 
complaints received by the Bureau.194 
The informational access that this oversight jurisdiction provides is 
considerable. While Congress undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction to 
investigate an agency based on specific complaints it receives, broader 
oversight jurisdiction granted to specific congressional committees means 
that Congress does not need to rely on complaints to trigger a review. 
Moreover, specifying monitoring functions can ensure that congressional 
committees keep a close watch on the Bureau’s activities, while also 
preventing jurisdictional disputes as to which congressional committees the 
CFPB need report. 
Congress may not be able to cut the CFPB’s budget under Dodd-Frank, 
but it can count on multiple opportunities for public congressional 
testimony and related press conferences every year. 195  Reporting and 
testimonial obligations keep Congress informed on CFPB rulemaking and 
other regulatory activity; congressional committees can make the Director 
and other CFPB bureaucrats squirm at these public events. 
Most importantly, congressional review provides a forum for 
threatening to use “the big club around the door”—repeal of disfavored 
regulation or even wholesale dismantling of the Bureau. 196  Oversight 
jurisdiction is an important step in publicly signaling congressional 
displeasure with a particular policy decision. These hearings permit 
members of Congress to gather information to assist in their own legislative 
agenda. They also permit Congress opportunities to invite industry actors 
and other administrative agencies to react to testimony. 
Although the Bureau is designed to be insulated from congressional 
intervention, the CFPB ignores congressional criticism at its peril. 
                                                                                                                                
 193. Id. § 1016(c)(1)–(9), 124 Stat. at 1974–75 (requiring “a discussion of the significant 
problems faced by consumers in shopping for or obtaining consumer financial products or 
services,” “a justification of the budget request of the previous year,” a list of significant rules and 
other initiatives adopted or created by the Bureau in the preceding year, an analysis of consumer 
complaints received by the Bureau, a list of the “public supervisory and enforcement actions” that 
the Bureau participated in during the preceding year, the Bureau’s actions taken against covered 
persons which are not credit unions or depository institutions, “an assessment of significant 
actions” by state attorneys general or regulators related to federal consumer financial law, “an 
analysis of the efforts of the Bureau to fulfill the fair lending mission of the Bureau,” and “an 
analysis of the efforts of the Bureau to increase workforce and contracting diversity consistent 
with the procedures established by the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion”). The CFPB 
may also submit this report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 
Id. § 1016(b), 124 Stat. at 1974 
 194. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1969 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493). Dodd-Frank also 
requires the CFPB to share this data on consumer complaints with the FTC and the prudential 
regulators. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 1969. 
 195. Id. § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496). 
 196. McNollgast, supra note 25, at 1651 (citing Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-
Bureaucratic System: A Principle Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. 
CHOICE 147, 155 (1984)).  
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Oversight jurisdiction provides Congress with an opportunity to formalize 
these complaints; it also provides the CFPB with a clear forum for 
articulating its side of the debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The CFPB is designed so that the Bureau might rise above the client 
politics that normally surround financial regulation and protect the diffuse 
interests of consumers even after concerns about the subprime mortgage 
crisis abate. 
Like many agencies, the CFPB is vested with jurisdiction of several 
different sorts. Because Congress granted the CFPB “exclusive” rulemaking 
authority, the Bureau’s independence is greatest when it issues regulations. 
This ostensibly “exclusive” regulatory authority is, however, subject to 
oversight, consultation, and coordination. 
The CFPB is less independent when viewed as an enforcement agent. 
Its enforcement authority is not exclusive. Given that regulation is only as 
effective as regulators are willing to enforce this law in the books this 
shared enforcement jurisdiction holds the key to the CFPB’s accountability 
to political and industry forces. Dodd-Frank divides the Bureau’s power to 
monitor and enforce the federal consumer financial laws in complex ways 
between federal and state authorities. While the CFPB holds greater 
enforcement authority over “large banks, savings associations, and credit 
unions,” its ability to examine even these “large banks” is shared with 
prudential regulators. With banks and other financial institutions with assets 
of $10 billion or less, the CFPB must rely on the relevant prudential 
regulator to enforce consumer financial protection regulation. And as to 
“covered persons” that are not banks, Dodd-Frank was also clear to retain 
the FTC as a contiguous regulator. 
The CFPB’s rulemaking and enforcement authorities are importantly 
interconnected. Because the Bureau shares enforcement jurisdiction with 
the OCC, the NCUA, and other bank regulators, as a practical matter, it will 
have to take prudential regulators’ concerns into account when 
promulgating regulations. Thus, while only the Financial Stability Council 
can veto a regulation promulgated by the Bureau, CFPB regulations might 
well be undermined by other regulators’ inaction as enforcement agents. 
Dodd-Frank crafts a complex regulatory space. This complex space 
means that descriptions of the CFPB’s jurisdiction are best portrayed as 
Venn diagrams. A prudential regulator cannot alone veto a regulation issued 
by the CFPB, but it can comment on it in the public record, lobby for the 
Council to set it aside, and thwart enforcement efforts. Moreover, although 
the CFPB is financially independent and headed by a single director, 
Congress can exert influence on the Bureau through its influence on other 
administrative agencies. It can reverse CFPB regulation legislatively. It can 
repeal the legislation that created the Bureau. 
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Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the power to promulgate consumer 
financial protection regulation that political actors disparage, but also 
creates incentives for crafting a consensus among regulators. Because the 
Bureau is designed so that it is accountable to a wide range of political 
actors, it just might accomplish the sort of effective consumer protection 
regulation that eluded earlier regulators. 
